26 January 2025
“It’s the economy, stupid!” – Major topics in the current German election campaign will be jobs, pensions, business, and migration, but for the first time in decades defense will also be a pivotal issue
Since the end of the Cold War and its role as a frontline state, Germany has neglected two key issues: its armed forces and the debate on defense and security issues. It was a comfortable common practice to accept that security and military protection was provided by NATO and the US, whilst economic success came with exports, particularly to China, and cheap energy was purchased and delivered from Russia. The welfare state grew, and social conflicts were easily solved by increasing subsidies and benefits. After February 24th, 2022 with the full-scale illegal aggression of Russia against Ukraine the dream of living like a larger version of Switzerland turned into an utter nightmare. Consequently, and for the first time in more than 30 years, German political campaigns must thoroughly prepare their party platforms for the upcoming snap elections on February 23rd, especially when it comes to defense and security. Nowadays, instead of leaving this topic to some experts, all top candidates of the major parties need to have clear positions and substantial ideas ready for public discussion and interviews.
All seven parties in reach of winning seats in the Bundestag have thus far decided on their policy or have at least presented a detailed draft of where they stand. However, only four of them – Conservatives, Social Democrats, the Greens, and the Free Democrats – will be potentially part of the government at the end of the day. The other three; far-left, far-right, and populist groups won’t have a realistic chance to be considered partners in the government. Yet, the key questions for all of them will be the volume of defense spending, the organization and modernization of the Bundeswehr, the relationship with Allies and NATO, the support of a national / European defense industry, and the role of the EU and its continued support for Ukraine.
The Conservative Christian Democrats (CDU/ CSU) who are, according to opinion researchers, probably winning the majority of votes describe the current NATO goal of 2 percent of a country’s GDP for defense investments as the lowest level of financial planning. Friedrich Merz, the CDU candidate for the chancellery, publicly repeated the idea of 2 percent as a minimum but refused to discuss higher numbers in detail. Instead, he underlined that any figure would be an auxiliary benchmark, the important factor being the results and efficiency of investments. The CDU platform has also suggested increasing the number of troops from 180,000 to 203,000 personnel. In the medium term, establishing a compulsory social service with the option of serving in the military or doing social or even care work, is another proposition, aiming at better access to the young generation for potential recruitment to active or reserve duty. Furthermore, creating a “drone army” as a branch of the Bundeswehr, enhanced cooperation with Allies and the US in particular, as well as the establishment of a National Security Council are further cornerstones of the conservative program policies. Continued support for Ukraine and increased sanctions against Russia are also part of the intended governmental agenda.
The Social Democrats (SPD) with their candidate and incumbent Chancellor Olaf Scholz and the highly popular Secretary of Defense Boris Pistorius want to invest in the future, at least 2 percent of the GDP, per year in the Bundeswehr. Like most other parties, they do not offer precise plans for how this should be managed after 2028 when the extra budget of 100 Bn Euro for military procurement will expire which was created as a response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. For a center-left party, it will be challenging to de-prioritize social welfare spending compared to military defense. As far as recruitment of servicemen is concerned, Social Democrats stick to voluntary military service. When it comes to the field of international cooperation with Allies and partners, the SPD is far closer to the Conservatives on certain foreign policies. Support for Ukraine should continue in a ‘responsible’ way, which is a ‘euphemism‘ for not delivering the German stand-off cruise missile “Taurus”. Common ground and understanding should be achievable for SPD, especially if the election results would lead to a new Grand Coalition with the CDU.
The Green Party gives a clear statement in their election program, indicating that they want a long-term investment of more than the proposed 2 percent of the GDP per year for defense which at least partly has to be financed by new national debts. The Green front-runner Robert Habeck, who is currently Minister for Economic Affairs and Climate Protection, specified in public that he presently sees a defense spending of up to 3,5 percent per year for a certain period, depending on how long it takes to catch up with the modernization of the Bundeswehr. Like the SPD the Green party wants to keep the voluntary service but with increased incentives to join. However, there are no details on how to cover these incentives and what they should look like. On the issue of international defense and security cooperation, the Greens are widely compatible with other relevant parties. On the topic of support for Ukraine, the Green Party is very dedicated to doing whatever it takes as long as necessary. Although several ranking members called for the delivery of “Taurus” cruise missiles to Ukraine, this claim didn’t make it into the Green election agenda.
The center-right Free Democrats (FDP) give a clear commitment to reach the 2 percent goal of NATO for defense investments and on the occasion NATO partners agree to increase that amount, Germany should follow. Christian Lindner, FDP’s top candidate, and former Minister of Finance of the “traffic light” coalition, suggested in 2024 to freeze social expenses and have a critical review of Germany’s development aid. His then-partners rejected his ideas and favored deficit spending instead. Moreover, the FDP is not only strongly supporting Ukraine, but it is the only party that is calling for the immediate delivery of “Taurus” cruise missiles. Another claim by the FDP is to develop the Bundeswehr in a way that it becomes the most powerful conventional force of the EU. The Free Democrats want to establish a national digital register of cohorts, for both men and women, who are potentially fit for service. Despite creating such a register the FDP does not consider compulsory military service but keeps voluntary service as their favorite model. Like in the case of the CDU, a National Security Council is a must for the Free Democrats (however, one has to keep in mind that in the German political and constitutional system an NSC would be quite different and less influential than for example in the US). In case the FDP becomes relevant for a future government, the party would fit well with other political actors when it comes to matters of defense and security.
Among the other far-right/left parties, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) has to be mentioned because it’s foreseeable that they will reach a substantial result, whereas the two extreme left parties will very likely struggle to get enough votes. However, all the other parties have indicated not to cooperate with the right-wing and populist AfD which leaves the opposition role for the party. Nevertheless, it has to be mentioned that their profile in Defense and Security (according to their program) is rather low. The AfD program gives no clear position regarding NATO’s 2 percent goal nor about the future organization of the Bundeswehr. The only very general claim is in favor of better finance and equipment. NATO membership is described as necessary until an independent and capable European military alliance is formed, but no details are given on how this should look. Additionally, and as of now, long-range US weapons in Germany are rejected. The future of Ukraine is seen as a neutral country outside NATO and the EU. The AfD wants to lift all sanctions against Russia immediately. Their front-runner, Alice Weidel, also called for re-opening the North Stream 2 pipeline and going back to gas deals with Russia. In this last point, she is in line with her extreme left and populist counterpart Sahra Wagenknecht. In summary, the AfD presents a party platform on Defense and Security which is far from being Realpolitik.
Outlook
After election day, it will typically take 4-8 weeks to negotiate a new government coalition. The parties will very likely try to finish by mid-April (or earlier) for symbolic as well as pragmatic reasons. First, the public will expect that a new government is in place before Easter, and second, that any new government will need as much time as possible to present new legislation and the budget planning to the Bundestag before the summer recess of the parliament.
Those parties in power will have to answer the crucial questions that most of them avoided while campaigning: How much financial resources will exactly be made available for defense during the years to come? And how are they generated, by additional debts or by cutting other expenses in the national budget? The financial plan of Germany’s national budget is made up of the current year, the next year, and – a non-binding – draft for the three following years (2027 – 2029). Once this document is presented in the second half of 2025 the debate on Germany’s future defense and security policy will reach a turning point.
Facts and figures:
GDP 2024: 4.306 bn Euro
National budget 2024: 488,9 bn Euro
Defense budget 2024: 51,9 bn Euro
Defense budget 2025 (planned): 53,25 bn Euro
Defense budget 2026 (planned): 53,25 bn Euro
Defense budget 2027 (planned): 53,5 bn Euro
Defense budget 2028 (planned): 80 bn Euro
Special Fund “Bundeswehr”: 100 bn Euro
German military support for Ukraine is listed here:
https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/service/military-support-ukraine-2054992
Dirk Schattschneider served as Under Secretary alongside various other management positions of the German government during the last two decades. He is also a long-time alumnus and supporter of several transatlantic fellowship programs and networks. The article gives his personal views only.